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In a small open country such as Slovenia, drivers can either purchase automotive fuel within 
the country or abroad. A simple demand model is used to test the proposition that changes in 
excise tax policy caused the decline of purchases in the country, and to delineate the effects of 
excise tax policy from the effects of the simultaneously occurring economic crisis. To do that, 
short- and long-run, and direct- and cross-price elasticities are estimated for the purchase of 
gasoline and automotive diesel in five regions: Slovenia's four border regions and the interior. 
For the estimation of "volume of transportation" elasticity, vehicle crossings through road 
sites with automatic traffic meters are used. The simulations indicate that more than half of 
the decline in the purchase of automotive fuels in 2009 can be attributed to excise tax policy 
and less than half to the economic crisis, and that the increase in tax revenues generated by 
excise tax policy significantly exceeded the decrease in the sellers' earnings.   
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1. Introduction   
 
Most empirical studies of price and income elasticity of demand for fuels deal with the subject in the 
framework of a traditional expenditure model and attempt to distinguish between short- and long-run 
elasticity. They use national or household-level data and different econometric techniques. More 
recent studies deal with the consequences of non-stationary and co-integrated time series, which imply 
that short-run elasticity should be estimated using an error correction method. A survey of 
international research dealing with responses to fuel price changes (D. J. Graham and S. Glaister, 
2002) reports large differences in countries between short- and long-run price elasticity, often 
dependent upon the estimation technique used. Nevertheless, the conclusions of most studies are 
similar; short-run price elasticity of demand for automotive fuels is relatively low, long-run price 
elasticity is higher and income elasticity is high. Recently, the possibility of a link between elasticity 
of demand for automotive fuels and fuel efficiency has come to the fore as researchers analyze the 
implications of fiscal policies for traffic levels, vehicle emissions and environmental issues (see 
Romero-Jordan et al., 2010). The aim of the research  presented in this paper was to quantify the 
effects of excise tax policy in the road fuels market, which  is heavily exposed to cross-border 
shopping. This brings us to many different concepts of interest such as distinction between elasticity 
on the national and local level (Crotte, A. et al., 2010; Besley and Rosen, 1998)., long and short run 
elasticity (M.L. Polemis, 2006), price asymmetry (Bettendorf, L. et al, 2003), taxation of fuels 
(S.Gupta and W. Mahler, 1995) etc.  Nielsen (2002) created a theoretical model which explains why 
net cross-border purchases not only flow from large to small countries, but  also in the "wrong" 
direction, (i.e. from small to large countries) if tax rates in the large country considerably exceed tax 
rates in the small country. Devereux at al. (2007) provided a general theoretical framework for the 
distinction between horizontal and vertical tax competition in excise taxes; they relate elastic demand 
for taxed goods with the likelihood of cross-border purchases and smuggling, which plays a role in the 
case of cigarettes but not gasoline in the empirical part of their study.  
 
 
2. Characteristics of the market   
 
Slovenia is a small open country and most consumers can buy automotive fuel, either within the 
country or abroad. The government therefore kept domestic retail sale prices below retail sale prices in 
neighboring countries. When, in December 2008, the government began to increase excise taxes to 
cope with the enormous fall in other tax revenues, the purchase of automotive fuels declined and the 
sellers began to blame tax policy for their drop in earnings. A simple demand model is used to test   3 
their viewpoint and to delineate the effects of excise tax policy from the effects of the world economic 
crisis.  
 
Two markets for automotive fuels are explored: the gasoline market and the automotive diesel market. 
The analysis is based on monthly data on gasoline and automotive diesel purchases from a sample of 
320 gasoline stations, or approximately 64 percent of gasoline stations in the country. The stations in 
the sample are well spread throughout the whole country, alongside major highways crossing the 
country, and connecting three neighboring countries (Austria, Hungary and Croatia) with Northern 
Adriatic ports and Italy. In the observed period, 2003–2009, the gasoline stations sold a monthly 
average of 47.2 million liters of automotive diesel; the quantity increased from 34.8 million liters in 
2003 to 62.0 million liters in 2008. During the same period, the average monthly quantity of 45.7 
million liters of gasoline decreased from 52.4 million liters in 2003 to 41.1 million liters in 2008.   
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The retail sale price of gasoline and automotive diesel is set using the "administrative price 
determination model", introduced in 2000. The model adjusts the "production" (pre-tax) price to the 
oil price in the Mediterranean and US dollar exchange rate every two weeks. The administratively set 
"mark-up" of a seller is included in order to cope with a dualistic market structure – two companies   4 
controlling approximately 90 percent of the market.
1 By adding 21 percent value added tax and excise 
tax (in absolute value per liter), the retail sale price is set. The excise tax thus allows the government 
to directly determine the retail sale price and, also, indirectly  – depending on price elasticity of 
demand  – quantities, tax revenues, purchases and the earnings of companies selling automotive fuels. 
Excise tax on automotive fuels also affects the amount of other goods sold at gasoline stations, notably 
cigarettes and alcoholic beverages – two items which are also subject to excise taxation. Furthermore, 
by affecting the earnings of gasoline stations, excise tax affects income tax and profit taxes paid by the 
companies and/or their employees. 
 
During the observed period, "production" prices (prices before taxes) in Slovenia did not differ greatly 
from "production" prices in neighboring countries and fluctuations were very similar. The differences 
in retail sale prices between Slovenia and neighboring countries were caused by taxation. In the 2003–
2008 period, gasoline and automotive diesel in Slovenia were approximately ten percent cheaper than 
in neighboring countries, the average domestic price of gasoline being EUR 0.991 for a liter and EUR 
0.971 for a liter of automotive diesel, while corresponding "foreign" prices were EUR 1.154 and EUR 
1.078, respectively.  
 
In December 2008, the Slovenian government began to increase excise taxes on automotive fuels to 
cope with a general fall in other tax revenues.
2 In effect, the government made use of the drop in world 
oil prices to enhance tax revenues. This altered previous policy, which had kept domestic retail sale 
prices below retail sale prices in neighboring countries. Indeed, in 2009, the gap between domestic and 
"foreign" prices for gasoline narrowed and the gap between domestic and "foreign" prices for 
automotive diesel disappeared entirely.






                                                 
1 The price determination model is considered to be appropriate in the existing situation in which the largest 
Slovenian company, Petrol, is a price taker in the oil market, while sharing a near duopoly with Austrian-owned 
OMV in the retail sale market of automotive fuels. 
  
2 Excise taxes on gasoline and automotive diesel are by far the most important source of revenues from excise 
taxation, and because of their flexibility they are crucial in maximizing tax revenues and the financial situation 
of the companies selling automotive fuels.    
 
3 There were no changes in Italy, while Croatia increased VAT from 22 percent to 23 percent in August without 
changing excise tax . Austria even reduced excise tax slightly in April, while Hungary decreased excise tax and 
increased VAT from 20 to 25 percent.   5 
Table 1 
Tax policy in Slovenia and neighboring countries in 2009  
 
  Austria  Croatia  Hungary    Italy  Slovenia 
gasoline  
price before taxes  -22.7  -13.5  -14.4  -12.0  -15.4 
taxes  +3.9  -4.8  -7.9  -2.9  +18.7 
retail sale price  -7.6  -8.7  -10.8  -5.9  +2.9 
automotive diesel  
price before taxes  -21.5  -17.8  -14.4  -18.7  -22.3 
taxes  +4.2  -4.4  -10.8  -2.2  +25.4 
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The purchase of automotive fuels declined considerably, possibly as a result of the economic crisis. 
This is reflected in the decline in transportation, due not only to the drop in economic activity in 
Slovenia and its neighboring countries, but also in other Eastern European countries such as Romania, 





The data on the quantities and prices of gasoline and automotive diesel in Slovenia and the data on 
prices in the four neighboring countries were provided by SNNK (Slovenian National Oil Committee). 
The number of days of administratively set price levels in a month was used to calculate the monthly 
price as a weighted average.  
   6 
Gasoline stations were grouped into four border regions and the interior. In each border region, the 
relative price of fuel is the retail sale price in Slovenia divided by the retail sale price in the 
corresponding neighboring country. For the interior, the relative price is the domestic retail sale price 
divided by the "foreign" retail sale price, which is a weighted average of retail sale prices in 




Crossings of road vehicles (monthly averages) 
 
border region with:  site  all vehicles  trucks  share of 
 trucks 
    average  SD  average  SD   
Italy  Škofije  408,757  99,713  12,333  3,687  3.0 
  Kozina  161,898  49,920  11,609  2,566  7.1 
  Fernetici  354,573  131,257  75,757  39,973  21.4 
  Vrtojba  220,078  30,649  47,042  8,332  21.3 
  Total  1,145,307  183,788  146,741  27,351  12.8 
             
Austria  Lipce  267,507  57,699  17,721  2,744  6.6 
  Šentilj  152,179  21,410  43,135  10,500  28.3 
  G. Radgona  137,948  30,238  5,916  1,208  4.3 
  Total  672,570  79,417  66,921  12,577  10.0 
             
Croatia  Obrežje  261,350  68,570  32,287  5,417  12.4 
  Gruškovje   243,532  116,876  25,354  4,847  10.4 
  Total  504,889  183,788  57,651  9,866  11.4 
             
Hungary  Lendava  149,500  54,749  73,217  28,507  48.9 
             
interior  LJ-North  897,387  74,698  53,341  9,470  5.9 
  LJ-South   821,260  108,107  75,684  16,177  9.2 
  LJ-East   818,923  97,561  66,392  12,438  8.1 
  Total  2,557,195  304,807  197,604  39,012  7.7 
             
TOTAL    5,029,461    542,184    10.7 
 
 
Monthly data on the volume of road transportation were obtained from daily data on vehicle crossings 
through 13 sites with automatic car and truck crossing meters. Four sites were situated on the roads in 
the region bordering Italy, three in the region bordering Austria, two in the region bordering Croatia 
and one in the region bordering Hungary. Three sites on the ring around the capital, Ljubljana, 
represent the interior. If a time series at a crossing site was interrupted, the dynamics on a nearby site 
were used instead.  
   7 
The percentage share of trucks of the total vehicles in the various regions differs considerably, ranging 
from 7.7 percent in the interior to 48.9 percent in the border region with Hungary. High standard errors 
reflect seasonal oscillations. The dynamics (yearly growth rates) in Table 3 and Graph 5 (trucks only) 
indicate that the economic crisis significantly reduced truck crossings, particularly in the border 
regions. In the first nine months of 2009, there were 25 percent fewer crossings than in the same 




Dynamics of cars and trucks in the period 2004–2009 
(yearly growth rates = 100* Xt / Xt-12)  
 
cars  trucks   
interior  border 
regions 
interior  border 
regions 
2004–2009  4.45  6.85  8.63  13.77 
2004  5.76  4.94  11.62  30.77 
2005  3.77  2.89  11.30  22.69 
2006  3.05  12.16  9.82  19.48 
2007  3.23  5.96  10.97  23.00 
2008  4.48  13.92  8.16  1.67 



















                                                 
4 In the entire period, the number of trucks grew by 13 percent yearly; in 2004, when Slovenia joined the EU, 
this figure increased by nearly 30 percent. On the other hand, the crisis did not affect car crossings - indeed, the 
figure in 2009 increased more than average.   
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4. Price and “volume of transport” elasticity 
 
The demand function should answer a "simple" question: Was the decline in the purchase of 
automotive fuels in 2009 caused by the economic crisis or by changes in excise tax policy, and/or what 
share of t he decline can be attributed to the former and what to the latter? As prices are set 
administratively, the causality and, therefore, the specification of the demand function is 
straightforward; a multiplicative  form enables straightforward estimation of price and "volume of 
transport" elasticity. As gasoline is only used by cars, while automotive diesel is used by both cars and 
trucks, the demand equations for automotive diesel have two "volume of transport" variables: car 
crossings and truck crossings.  
 
As Slovenia's size and income level differs from the size and income levels of neighboring countries,
5 
affecting price and income elasticity, one could expect strong response to changes in relative prices in 
the regions bordering neighboring counties  even i n the case of otherwise low price-elasticity of 
demand for automotive fuels. Furthermore, one could expect asymmetry,  defined as a difference 
between  the response to a one percent change in the domestic price of automotive fuels  and  the 
response to a one p ercent change in the corresponding "foreign" price. The asymmetry as defined 
above should be stronger in demand for gasoline used only by cars and weaker in demand for 
automotive diesel, as a large share of diesel is sold to truck drivers who cross the country comparing 
relative rather than absolute prices. Furthermore, as they can cross Slovenia without purchasing fuel in 
the country, their response to changes in relative prices can also be expected to be strong.  
 
The demand function is of the following form:  
 






ß6 * …ut  (1) 
or 





ß4 * ….ut    (2) 
where:  
Yt – quantity sold in period t 
Pdt – price of gasoline or automotive diesel in Slovenia 
Pft – price of gasoline or automotive diesel in Austria, Italy, Hungary or Croatia 
Pdt//Pft – relative price 
Tt – crossing of vehicles 
                                                 
5 Austria and Italy (particularly its relevant Northern part) are richer, while Croatia and Hungary are poorer than 
Slovenia.   9 
Xit – other relevant factors affecting purchases 
ut – random error 
ß1 – domestic price elasticity of demand 
ß2 – "foreign" price elasticity of demand  
ß3, ß4 – "volume of transportation" elasticity of demand 
ß5 – elasticity of demand of other relevant determinants 
 
According to basic textbook economics, the position of the demand curve is set by the volume of 
transportation or number of vehicles crossing the sites with traffic meters, while the slope is set by the 
price elasticity of demand. In Equation (1), the value of ß1 should be negative and the value of ß2 
positive. Indeed, ß2 could be considered to be cross-elasticity of demand while automotive fuel in a 
neighboring country can be considered a nearly perfect substitute for automotive fuel in Slovenia. If 
the absolute direct price elasticity exceeds 1, the quantity would decrease, which would lower 
purchases, the earnings of the companies and tax revenues; if direct price elasticity is less than 1, the 
quantity and the earnings (determined administratively as a fixed mark-up for a liter) of the companies 
selling fuel would decrease, while purchases and tax revenues would increase. The effects of cross-
elasticity are similar with the opposite sign. The expected values of ß3 (crossings of trucks) and ß4 
(crossings of cars) are positive. If there is symmetry in the responses of drivers to changes in domestic 
and "foreign" prices, i.e. if only relative prices matter, Equation (1) can be replaced by Equation (2).   
 
To diminish the effects of other factors (long-run changes in fuel efficiency or in the structure of cars, 
etc.), which also affect the quantity of gasoline and automotive diesel – and because we are interested 
in what happened in 2009, price and "volume of transportation" elasticities were estimated for the 
period 2006/01 – 2009/09 only.
6 The number of observations was therefore reduced to 45. Long- and 
short-run demand elasticities for gasoline and automotive diesel were estimated for each border region 
and the interior separately, assuming symmetry and also allowing for asymmetric responses. The 
short-run elasticities were estimated using an error correction method. The results are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5; in the former assuming price symmetry (Equation 2), in the latter allowing for price 






                                                 
6 The accession of Slovenia and other CEE countries to the EU in May 2004 increased transit considerably.    10 
 
Table 4 
Long-run and short-run price and "volume of transportation" elasticity of demand for 
automotive fuels with a symmetric response to price changes  
 
log Yt  = ß0 + ß1 * log (Pdt/Pft ) + ß3 * log Tcarst
   + ß4 *  log Ttruckst  (long-run) 
 
dlog Yt  = ß0 + ß1 * dlog (Pdt/Pft ) + ß3 * dlog Tcarst
   + ß4 * dlog Ttruckst +  
 
  + ß5 * (log Yt-1 – logYt-1) (short- run) 
   
border region 
with:  gasoline  diesel 
 
ß1  ß3 
 













































































































































t – values in parentheses 
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Coefficients presented in Table 4 are in accordance with expectations; both long and short run price 
elasticity being high in the border regions and low in the interior of the country; short run  price 
elasticity being lower than long run. Error correction term has proper negative sign. The behavior of 
car drivers regarding “volume of transportation” elasticity differs by region. In the region bordering 
Italy (with the most expensive gasoline), the quantity increases more than the number of cars driving 
in the region; this would imply that tourists (visits peak in the summer months) buy relatively more 
gasoline in Slovenia than the local population, which buy a higher share in winter months. High price 
elasticity reflects large price differences. In the region bordering Austria (where the links between the 
region on the Slovenian side and Austria are partly hindered by mountains), the quantity of gasoline 
fluctuates with the number of car crossings in the region, and price elasticity is close to -1. Car drivers 
from Croatia and Hungary, which are both poorer and non-euro countries, apparently do not readily 
choose to buy gasoline in Slovenia, and both react strongly to relative prices. Finally, price elasticity 
of demand for gasoline in the interior is extremely low, while “volume of transportation” elasticity is 
close to 1.   
 
Demand for automotive diesel differs from the demand for gasoline. The price elasticity for 
automotive diesel in the interior is high, which reflects the importance of transit for the whole country, 
which is intersected by two highways. The demand is price elastic in the regions bordering Austria and 
Italy, and inelastic in the regions bordering Croatia and Hungary. Insignificant "volume of 
transportation" elasticity in the border region with Austria is the only surprising result, but this can be 
explained by high price elasticity of demand for automotive diesel in the interior. Most of trucks 
transiting Slovenia may use numerous petrol stations on the highway in the interior.  
 
Graphs 4 and 5 are illustrative. Graph 4 exhibits actual and estimated quantities of gasoline in all four 
border regions; these data are obtained by summing the actual and estimated values of the regions, 
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Graph 4 
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Table 5 
Long- and short-run price and "volume of transportation" elasticity of demand for automotive 
fuels with an asymmetric response to price changes 
 
log Yt  = ß0 + ß1 * log Pdt + ß2 * log Pft  + ß3 * log Tcarst
   + ß4 *  log Ttruckst (long-run) 
 
dlog Yt  = ß0 + ß1 * dlog Pdt  + ß2 * Pft  + ß3 * dlog Tcarst
   + ß4 * dlog Ttruckst +  
 










ß2  ß3 
 
ß5  ß1 
 































































































































































































t – values in parentheses 
 
 
Most coefficients in Table 5 (Equation 1) are also in accordance with expectations; with direct price 
elasticity ß1 being negative and cross price elasticity  ß2  positive; short run  direct and cross price   14 
elasticity is lower than long run direct and cross price elasticity. Error correction term retains proper 
negative sign.  The responses to price changes are asymmetric; c ar drivers react strongly to price 
change in a neighboring country and less to price change in Slovenia which can be explained by the  
difference in the country size. Strong asymmetry which exists in the demand for gasoline does not 
exist in the demand for automotive diesel  – most coefficients which enable distinction are 
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5. Simulations 
5.1. Effects of excise tax policy on quantities, purchases, earnings, excise taxes, value added taxes 
and total tax revenues 
 
Excise tax policy in the period 2003–2009 had three distinct periods: a period of "neutral" policy in 
which excise tax in euros changed frequently (partly because of the fluctuation of the tolar, the former 
Slovenian currency, towards the euro) since the middle of 2005; this was followed by a period in 
which the excise tax was fixed and thus automatically anti-inflationary; and finally the period after 
December 2008 in which the government tried to compensate for the loss of tax revenues by 
increasing the excise tax on automotive fuels. The shift from the second to the third period is analyzed 
here as the original aim of the research project (on which this paper is based) was to estimate the 
consequences of the shift in excise tax policy. As excise tax in absolute value per liter directly 
increases retail sale price, Table 6 compares actual retail sale prices for gasoline and automotive diesel 
with the prices if excise tax policy remained unchanged. In such a case, gasoline and automotive diesel 
would be approximately 15 percent cheaper, which would, depending on price elasticity, affect 
quantities, purchases, earnings and tax revenues.  
 
Table 6  
Actual and experimental retail sale prices of gasoline and automotive diesel 
 









alternative  ratio 
2008/11  0.993  0.993  1.00 0.915  0.915  1.00 
/12  0.916  0.881  0.96 0.829  0.811  0.97 
2009/01  0.933  0.822  0.88 0.881  0.787  0.89 
2  0.947  0.823  0.87 0.956  0.836  0.87 
3  0.949  0.793  0.84 0.963  0.840  0.87 
4  0.981  0.820  0.84 0.995  0.871  0.88 
5  0.999  0.825  0.83 1.025  0.902  0.88 
6  1.036  0.861  0.83 1.092  0.969  0.89 
7  1.045  0.871  0.83 1.103  0.960  0.87 
8  1.040  0.884  0.85 1.130  0.973  0.86 
9  1.042  0.886  0.85 1.118  0.961  0.86 
10  1.025  0.869  0.85 1.090  0.923  0.85 
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In calculating the effects of the policy, the long-run el asticities presented in Table 4 (assuming 
symmetry of domestic and "foreign" price changes) were used. The overall effects of alternative excise 
tax policy (i.e. keeping excise tax unchanged) are summarized in Table 7, while the individual effects 
of altered excise tax policy for both gasoline and automotive diesel (all regions) are shown in 
Appendix A by the differences between the experimental solution (the continuation of prior tax policy) 
and the control solution (actual tax policy). Graph 6 illustrates the effects on the quantity of 
automotive diesel in the interior. 
 
Table 7 
Overall effects of alternative excise tax policy for the sellers and government in the period 
2008/12 – 2009/9 
(gasoline and automotive fuel)  
 
border region with:  AT  HR  HU  IT 
? 
borders  interior  Total 
quantity (liters 000s)  10,416  4,020  2,445  23,068  39,948 58,545  98,493 
purchases (EUR 000s)  738  -587  668  7,611  8,432 -45,465  -37,034 
earnings (EUR 000s)  808  321  194  1,793  3,116 4,470  7,587 
excise tax revenues (EUR 
000s)  -3,557  -4.27  -371  748  -3,606 -61,473  -65,080 
VAT revenues (EUR 
000s)  123  -98  2  1,268  1,295 -7,579  -6,284 
tax revenues (EUR 000s)   -3,434  -525  -369  2,017  -2,311 -69,052  -71,363 
 
 
Graph 6  
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In short, by increasing excise taxes, the government collected an extra EUR 71 million (EUR 65 
million of excise tax and EUR 6 million of value added tax). On the other hand, gasoline stations sold  
98.5 million fewer liters of fuel and lost EUR 7.6 million in net revenues; while cash flow increased 
by EUR 37 million. 
 
To illustrate the results in the Appendix, let us look at January 2009. If excise tax policy had remained 
unchanged, the gasoline stations would have sold 1.229 million more liters of gasoline (1.142 million 
in the border regions and 87,000 in the interior). Euro purchases would have diminished by EUR 
2.171 million (a EUR 2.511 million drop in the interior and a EUR 340,000 rise in the border regions). 
The gasoline stations would have earned EUR 100,000 more (EUR 93,000 in the border regions and 
EUR 7,000 in the interior). The government would have collected EUR 1.819 million less from excise 
taxes (EUR 289,000 more in the border regions and EUR 2.118 million less in the interior). Tax 
revenues from VAT would have been EUR 374,000 lower (EUR 45,000 higher in the border regions 
and EUR 419,000 lower in the interior). Finally, total tax revenues would have been EUR 2.213 
million lower, due to a loss of EUR 2.537 million in the interior and a gain of EUR 334,000 in the 
border region.  
 
The effects of the alternative tax policy on the automotive diesel market would have been greater. 
Gasoline stations would have sold 5.149 million more liters of automotive diesel (1.767 million liters 
in the border regions and 3.652 million liters in the interior). Purchases would have decreased by EUR 
366,000 (an increase of EUR 246,000 in the border regions and a decrease of EUR 613,000 in the 
interior). Gasoline stations would have earned EUR 413,000 more (EUR 135,000 in the border regions 
and 278,000 in the interior). The government would have collected EUR 2.379 million less from 
excise tax (EUR 471,000 in the border regions and EUR 1.908 million in the interior). The revenues 
from VAT would have been EUR 61,000 lower (an increase of EUR 41,000 in the border regions and 
a decrease of EUR 102,000 in the interior). Altogether, tax revenues would have fallen by EUR 2.440 
million, (EUR 2.010 million in the interior and EUR 430,000 in the border regions).  
 
5.2. Separation of the tax policy effects from the crisis effects  
 
Long-run price elasticity of demand was used to establish the effects of the changes in excise tax 
policy in the period 2008/12 – 2009/9 by comparing the experimental solution to the control solution. 
The experimental solution was easy to define as "no change in excise tax policy". To define the 
"absence of economic crisis" scenario is not so straightforward. Indeed, "income" in the demand 
equation was replaced by transportation activity, which is measured by the number of car and truck   18 
crossings. Therefore, the question is: what would happen if there were no changes in the number of 
crossings and/or what is a "normal" number of crossings? The "normality" is defined as the number of 
crossings if growth rates from the period 2005/1 – 2008/7 would also continue after August 2008 
(considered here as the starting point of the crisis). As the crisis hit truck transportation and transit 
particularly hard, the rest of the paper deals with automotive diesel only. The results of the simulations 
which enable the partitioning of the effects of the crisis and the tax policy are shown in Tables 8 and 9; 
they are depicted in Graph 7. 
 
Table 8 
Partitioning of the crisis and excise tax policy on the quantity of automotive diesel 
(000 liters) 
 




policy  total  crisis 
tax 
policy  total  crisis 
tax 
policy  total 
2008/8  1,618  0  1,618  1,283  0  1,283  2,900  0  2,900 
9  -178  0  -178  251  0  251  73  0  73 
10  2,224  0  2,224  1,308  0  1,308  3,532  0  3,532 
11  2,718  0  2,718  1,629  0  1,629  4,348  0  4,348 
12  1,348  1,382  2,636  1,905  637  2,639  3,253  2,018  5,274 
2009/1  4,599  3,652  8,185  2,967  1,767  5,260  7,566  5,419  13,445 
2  4,453  4,285  8,637  2,699  1,924  5,173  7,152  6,210  13,810 
3  1,673  6,807  8,534  2,682  3,042  6,460  4,355  9,849  14,995 
4  5,827  6,398  12,320  3,530  3,059  7,528  9,357  9,456  19,848 
5  4,298  7,098  11,556  3,194  3,465  7,570  7,491  10,563  19,126 
6  4,376  6,674  11,169  3,319  3,322  7,532  7,695  9,996  18,701 
7  1,053  7,783  8,858  4,151  3,376  8,632  5,204  11,159  17,490 
8  2,430  6,522  8,988  4,575  2,848  8,467  7,006  9,370  17,455 
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Table 9 
Relative contribution of the crisis and tax policy to the decline of purchases 
of automotive diesel 
  




policy  crisis 
tax 
policy  crisis 
tax 
policy 
2008/8  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 
/9  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 
/10  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 
/11  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 
/12  0.494  0.506  0.749  0.251  0.617  0.383 
2009/1  0.557  0.443  0.627  0.373  0.583  0.417 
/2  0.510  0.490  0.584  0.416  0.535  0.465 
/3  0.197  0.803  0.469  0.531  0.307  0.693 
/4  0.477  0.523  0.536  0.464  0.497  0.503 
/5  0.377  0.623  0.480  0.520  0.415  0.585 
/6  0.396  0.604  0.500  0.500  0.435  0.565 
/7  0.119  0.881  0.551  0.449  0.318  0.682 
/8  0.271  0.729  0.616  0.384  0.428  0.572 


































































































The "administrative price determination model" which adjusts "production" price to the oil price in the 
Mediterranean and US dollar exchange rate every two weeks together with the administratively set 
"mark-up", value added tax and excise tax allow the government to directly determine the retail sale 
price which – depending on price elasticity of demand – determines quantities, tax revenues, purchases 
and the earnings of companies selling automotive fuels. However, in a small open country such as 
Slovenia, drivers can either purchase automotive fuel within the country or abroad.  The 
government therefore kept domestic retail sale prices below retail sale prices in neighboring countries 
until December 2008, when it altered previous policy to cope with the enormous fall in other tax 
revenues. The gap between domestic and "foreign" prices for gasoline narrowed and the gap between 
domestic and "foreign" prices for automotive diesel disappeared. The altered excise tax policy reduced 
purchases of gasoline only in the regions bordering neighboring countries while purchases of 
automotive diesel were reduced also in the interior which is crossed by two highways connecting 
neighboring countries. The responses to price changes for gasoline  were asymmetric; car drivers 
reacted strongly to price change in a neighboring country and less to price change in Slovenia. This is 
not the case in the automotive diesel market where truck drivers crossing the country react to relative 
prices. In ten months of the new tax policy in 2009, nearly 100 million fewer liters of automotive fuels 
were sold, oil companies lost € 7.6 million, while the government collected an extra € 71 million by 
excise and VAT tax.  By using the “volume of transportation” elasticity one can separate the effects of 
tax policy from the effects of economic crisis; in the case of more affected market for automotive 
diesel  more than half of the decline in the purchase in 2009 can be attributed to excise tax 
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with  Austria  Croatia  Hungary  Italy  ?bodres  interior  Total 
               
quantity (1000 liters) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  49  50  32  118  249  18  267 
2009/1  238  232  139  533  1142  87  1229 
2  249  238  141  495  1122  100  1223 
3  274  256  142  663  1334  123  1457 
4  279  291  145  726  1442  115  1557 
5  283  286  153  725  1446  114  1561 
6  282  283  141  656  1362  102  1464 
7  284  395  196  818  1693  126  1819 
8  382  444  224  1198  2248  134  2382 
9  306  349  217  795  1667  134  1800 
               
purchases (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  -9  14  32  39  76  -528  -452 
2009/1  -42  65  139  177  340  -2511  -2171 
2  -47  72  141  177  342  -3106  -2764 
3  -52  78  142  238  405  -3824  -3419 
4  -55  92  145  270  451  -3717  -3266 
5  -58  93  153  278  466  -3811  -3345 
6  -62  99  141  269  447  -3658  -3211 
7  -62  138  196  336  608  -4504  -3897 
8  -85  158  224  501  797  -4860  -4063 
9  -67  123  217  328  601  -4810  -4208 
               
earnings (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  4  4  3  10  20  1  22 
2009/1  19  19  11  43  93  7  100 
2  20  19  11  40  91  8  99 
3  22  21  12  54  109  10  119 
4  23  24  12  59  117  9  127 
5  23  23  12  59  118  9  127 
6  23  23  11  53  111  8  119 
7  23  32  16  67  138  10  148 
8  31  36  18  97  183  11  194 
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Table A2 
The effects of alternative excise tax policy  for gasoline for the governement 
 
border 
with  Austria  Croatia  Hungary  Italy  ?borders  interior  Total 
               
excise tax revenues (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  -23  19  12  44  52  -446  -394 
2009/1  -106  101  61  233  289  -2118  -1829 
2  -123  109  65  227  278  -2622  -2344 
3  -137  118  65  306  351  -3228  -2877 
4  -149  134  67  336  389  -3140  -2751 
5  -159  132  71  335  378  -3221  -2843 
6  -178  131  65  303  321  -3094  -2773 
7  -177  189  94  391  497  -3809  -3312 
8  -244  218  110  586  670  -4110  -3441 
9  -191  171  106  389  475  -4067  -3592 
               
VAT revenues (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  -1  2  3  6  10  -88  -78 
2009/1  -7  11  11  30  45  -419  -374 
2  -8  12  12  29  46  -518  -472 
3  -9  13  12  40  56  -637  -581 
4  -9  15  13  45  64  -620  -555 
5  -10  16  14  46  67  -635  -569 
6  -10  16  14  45  65  -610  -545 
7  -10  23  20  56  88  -751  -663 
8  -14  26  23  83  118  -810  -692 
9  -11  20  22  55  86  -802  -716 
               
tax revenues = excise tax  + VAT  (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  -24  21  14  51  62  -534  -472 
2009/1  -113  112  72  263  334  -2537  -2203 
2  -131  121  77  257  324  -3140  -2816 
3  -146  131  78  345  408  -3866  -3458 
4  -158  150  80  381  453  -3760  -3307 
5  -169  148  85  381  445  -3856  -3412 
6  -188  147  79  348  386  -3704  -3318 
7  -187  212  113  447  585  -4560  -3975 
8  -258  244  132  670  788  -4920  -4132 
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TableA3 





with  Austria  Croatia  Hungary  Italy  ?borders  interior  Total 
 
quantity (000 liters) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  217  27  21  371  637  1382  2018 
2009/1  625  74  63  1006  1767  3652  5419 
2  613  82  74  1156  1924  4285  6210 
3  847  125  105  1964  3042  6807  9849 
4  883  138  101  1937  3059  6398  9456 
5  975  146  114  2231  3465  7098  10563 
6  1017  149  108  2049  3322  6674  9996 
7  855  176  122  2223  3376  7783  11159 
8  1004  147  97  1599  2848  6522  9370 
9  753  133  111  1806  2802  6891  9694 
               
purchases (000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  35  -34  -19  111  93  -238  -145 
2009/1  98  -89  -56  293  246  -613  -366 
2  97  -100  -66  340  270  -725  -455 
3  131  -149  -93  567  456  -1131  -675 
4  141  -170  -92  578  457  -1099  -642 
5  158  -182  -105  673  544  -1234  -690 
6  171  -193  -104  643  518  -1207  -689 
7  146  -231  -119  705  500  -1422  -922 
8  172  -194  -95  510  393  -1198  -805 
9  129  -176  -109  577  422  -1269  -847 
               
earnings (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  17  2  2  28  49  105  154 
2009/1  48  6  5  77  135  278  413 
2  47  6  6  88  147  327  474 
3  65  10  8  150  232  519  751 
4  67  11  8  148  233  488  721 
5  74  11  9  170  264  541  806 
6  78  11  8  156  253  509  762 
7  65  13  9  169  257  594  851 
8  77  11  7  122  217  497  715 
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Table A4 
The effects of alternative excise tax policy  for automotive diesel  for the government 
 
border 
with  Austria  Croatia  Hungary  Italy  ?borders  interior  Total 
 
excise tax revenues (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  -65  -40  -25  -68  -198  -795  -992 
2009/1  -158  -102  -71  -141  -471  -1908  -2379 
2  -155  -115  -84  -160  -513  -2248  -2761 
3  -194  -169  -115  -232  -711  -3383  -4093 
4  -219  -194  -115  -257  -785  -3356  -4142 
5  -244  -208  -132  -299  -882  -3764  -4646 
6  -280  -223  -131  -315  -948  -3777  -4725 
7  -241  -268  -151  -355  -1015  -4486  -5501 
8  -293  -226  -122  -270  -911  -3835  -4746 
9  -221  -205  -139  -307  -872  -4065  -4936 
               
VAT revenues (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  6  -6  -3  19  15  -40  -24 
2009/1  16  -15  -9  49  41  -102  -61 
2  16  -17  -11  57  45  -121  -76 
3  22  -25  -16  94  76  -189  -113 
4  24  -28  -15  96  76  -183  -107 
5  26  -30  -18  112  91  -206  -115 
6  29  -32  -17  107  86  -201  -115 
7  24  -39  -20  118  83  -237  -154 
8  29  -32  -16  85  65  -200  -134 
9  22  -29  -18  96  70  -211  -141 
               
tax revenues (excise tax + VAT) (1000 €) 
2008/11  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  -59  -46  -29  -49  -182  -835  -1017 
2009/1  -141  -117  -81  -92  -430  -2010  -2440 
2  -139  -131  -95  -104  -468  -2369  -2837 
3  -173  -194  -131  -137  -635  -3571  -4206 
4  -195  -223  -130  -161  -709  -3539  -4249 
5  -218  -238  -149  -186  -792  -3970  -4761 
6  -251  -255  -149  -207  -862  -3978  -4840 
7  -217  -306  -171  -237  -932  -4723  -5655 
8  -265  -258  -138  -185  -845  -4034  -4880 
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Table A5 
Partition of crisis effects and tax policy effects on quantity of automotive diesel 
(000 liters) 
 
obs   Y  Y crisis  Y tax policy  Y both 
INTERIOR 
2008/8  42176  44018  42176  43793 
2008/9  47537  47335  47537  47358 
2008/10  48239  50778  48239  50463 
2008/11  44326  47440  44326  47044 
2008/12  41015  42362  42396  43650 
2009/1  32553  37152  36205  40738 
2009/2  34140  38593  38425  42776 
2009/3  41635  43308  48442  50169 
2009/4  39312  45138  45709  51632 
2009/5  40705  45003  47803  52261 
2009/6  39622  43998  46296  50791 
2009/7  47223  48276  55006  56081 
2009/8  44649  47080  51171  53637 
2009/9   47276  47595  54168  54489 
BORDER REGIONS 
2008/8  16878  18160  16878  18160 
2008/9  16736  16987  16736  16987 
2008/10  16234  17542  16234  17542 
2008/11  14275  15905  14275  15905 
2008/12  13189  15094  13825  15827 
2009/1  10866  13834  12634  16127 
2009/2  10544  13243  12468  15717 
2009/3  12476  15158  15518  18936 
2009/4  12706  16236  15765  20234 
2009/5  13288  16482  16753  20859 
2009/6  13347  16666  16670  20879 
2009/7  14054  18205  17430  22686 
2009/8  13621  18197  16469  22088 
2009/9   13214  16531  16017  20095 
OVERALL 
2008/8  59053  62178  59053  61954 
2008/9  64273  64322  64273  64345 
2008/10  64473  68320  64473  68005 
2008/11  58601  63345  58601  62949 
2008/12  54203  57456  56222  59478 
2009/1  43419  50986  48838  56864 
2009/2  44684  51836  50893  58493 
2009/3  54111  58465  63959  69105 
2009/4  52018  61375  61474  71866 
2009/5  53993  61485  64557  73119 
2009/6  52969  60664  62965  71670 
2009/7  61277  66481  72436  78767 
2009/8  58271  65276  67640  75725 
2009/9   60491  64127  70184  74584 
 
 